Reshaping the national bounds through fandom: the UltrAslan of Galatasaray

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Since the murder of two Leeds United fans during a 2000 Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Cup game in Istanbul, Turkish fandom has often been stigmatized as particularly violent and nationalistic. This article intends to deconstruct this negative perception through the case study of the UltrAslan, the hardcore fans of Galatasaray. The Turkish reinterpretation of a fandom model born in Italy showed a new model of organization: The 'footballistic church'. This notion describes an elaborate institution with the Universalist vocation of gathering the largest fan base. It shows how the Turkish ultras have deepened the identification with their club, transcending local, ethnic, political or religious identities. By rejecting the deep schisms that divide the country, the fans' group can be viewed as a new model of a national community.

Introduction

In his pioneering research among European football supporters, the French anthropologist Christian Bromberger pointed out the paradox of how a 'futile game' such as football could be invested with the greatest passion.[1] According to Bromberger, football has become a universal language, a total spectacle and beyond its apparent futility, the researcher is able to perceive deep collective representations (social, identity, economic or political) inherent in this leisure activity shared by millions and in the 'banal' passions of the supporters.[2] Referring to the Clifford Geertz's study on cockfights in Bali, Bromberger estimates that beyond the simplicity of the football game, lays a philosophical drama that tells a lot on the general context of the modern societies. Instead of being a banal, simple or futile leisure activity, football is, according to Bromberger, 'the most important trifle in the world'.[3] In this sense, football can be pictured as a concentrating mirror of the complexity, the tensions and the trends that a society can experience or perform. Such complexity is evident of course also in Turkey. As shown by political scientist Jean-François Polo, professional sport (and especially football) could be an important political and diplomatic tool for Turkey to promote its image in Europe.[4] A winning Turkish sport team, – whether a club, as with Galatasaray winning the union of European football association (UEFA) Cup and Super Cup in 2000, or the national team, placing third in the 2002 Mundial, – helps the Turkish authorities ease the erratic process of integration into the European Union and therefore to affirm that Turkey is indeed part of Europe and belong to part of its organizations. Polo also points out that sport in Turkey reveals the ambiguous feelings Turkish fans express towards Europe. Even

Telif hakkı olan materyal

if Europe remains a reference point, the successes and the failures of the Turkish teams are sometimes followed by powerful and violent nationalist reactions. It is for this reason that Polo points to Turkey as a significant manifestation of the political frustrations and the social unrests of a challenged national community.[5] Focusing on the Turkish press coverage of football teams, sociologist Emre Gökalp shares the same conclusion about the ambiguous interactions that the country's media display in regard to Europe as it is caught between the will for European recognition and the nationalist desire for a revival of 'military' conquest, viewing sporting success as re-living the glorious past conquests of the Ottoman empire.[6] Going further, Gökalp concludes that the press coverage 'constitutes a reproduction of ethnic and banal nationalism. The sport press, in its headlines and columns, constructs the Turkish nation as natural and homogenous unity, and consolidates essentialist conceptions of national identity'[7].

Until now, the issue of nationalism has remained predominant in the academic research devoted to Turkish football and Turkish fandom.[8] Because of their intention to present global developments at both the football and national arenas, these researchers also share a common approach, as their methodological choices kept them relatively distant from the fans groups. In this study, I focus on a specific group of Galatasaray fans, the UltrAslan. I examine the group's place in the global supporters' frame, and more specifically in the ultras movement of to which it clearly refers to.

While the phenomena of fans are a complex one and must take into account the complexity and diversity of local conditions, circumstances and histories, it is possible and while there have been links between the game and ardent support as well as with violence we can note four main radical supporters phenomenon around the world. These include British hooliganism, born in England between the two World Wars but truly expending during the 1960s; the Torcida movement, born in Brazil in the 1940s; the Barras Brava which emerged in Argentina in the 1950s; and the ultras movement, born in Italy in 1968 with the 'La Fossa dei Leoni' (The Lions' Den)[9] formed in Milan in 1968.[10]

The ultras movement is the youngest of the four but is also the most present in the supporters' landscape. We could distinguish three phases in its recent expansion. In the 1980s, it took root in Southern Europe (France, Spain, Yugoslavia, Portugal, Switzerland and Greece). In the 1990s, there was a complete Europeanization of the movement (the Netherlands, Germany, Scotland, Scandinavian countries, ex-socialist countries and Turkey). Since 2000s, there has been a globalization of the movement (Maghreb, Jordan, Syria, Canada, the USA, Japan, China, South Korea and Australia).[11]

The precise definition of which group can be qualified as ultras is difficult to make, and it would not be an exaggeration to state that there are as many definitions as there are fans, but, looking at the Latin etymology of the word (ultras means 'beyond'), we can propose this definition: the ultras make a radical change in the supporters' practices as they encourage going further for the love of the team. The term implies to go 'beyond', in and out of the stadium, from what the common or casual supporters usually do. In the stadium, the ultras groups organize and rationalize the *tifo*, (the Italian word for 'supporting',) which in the ultras language covers all their activities: banners, flags, visual shows called *coregrafia* (choreography,) drumming, to name but a few. These supporters' rituals are handled by vocal leaders who encourage the crowd through microphones or bullhorns. Outside the stadium, the ultras tend to seek physical fights with their opponents. They also

rationalize this violent aspect of their subculture because they systematize the physical targets (basically the other ultras or radical supporters) and the symbolic targets (ultras emblems such as banners, flags or 'material').[12] As a consequence, the ultras usually establish a significant communitarian life, as they often gather all week long to prepare the supporters' ritual and to discuss the group's organization and future. These activities contribute to the creation and maintenance of a strong sense of identity within the group. Some ultras' slogans such as 'Being ultras seven days per week' or 'Being ultras in everyday life, not only during the game' demonstrate how this fan subculture has gone beyond the strict football framework itself.

The emergence of Turkish ultras groups

One of the challenges raised by the internationalization of the ultras movement is locating the precise moment when the imported subculture replaced or merged with the pre-existing supporters' traditions. In Turkey, we can see the origins of an organized Turkish fandom in 1963. That year, Birol Peker, a footballer playing for the Beşiktaş team, was going to be transferred to the archrival team of Fenerbahçe. Protesting against this planned move, 20 fans of Beşiktaş, who proclaimed themselves as 'The Amigos', led the player from his home to the Beşiktaş headquarters, trying to convince him to stay with the team. After this action, the term 'Amigos' was used to describe the fan leaders operating in the stands. 'The Amigos' phenomenon was the first attempt to transform the fans' rituals by creating new songs and visual ideas. There were earlier songs and chants but the phenomenon of a defined and accepted leader of these activities was new in Turkish stadiums. Very quickly, these 'Amigos' developed close relations with the presidents of their clubs, who used the devoted fans as a powerful leverage in their struggle to gain greater influence within the teams' administrative boards. In return, the fan groups could derive important economic benefits from the clubs and money to finance their banners or flags. However, 'The Amigos' remained informal: they never succeeded in creating a proper group identity because they were too dependent of the influence and personality of their leaders.[13]

Since the early 1990s, the ultras model of fan support became common. After the 1980 *coup d'état*, the Army tightly controlled the national federation and how Turkish clubs had to behave. In the mid-1980s, Prime Minister Turgut Özal came to power and decided to reform and liberalize many sectors of Turkish society including Turkish football. One of his first measures was to give a certain political autonomy to the federation. Because he wanted to build competitive teams, he understood that the clubs had to increase their financial powers, and that they had to turn to private capital. He also wanted to strengthen the national teams and help them reach the highest levels of the European football competitions. As a result of the political liberalization and the infusion of money, the Turkish teams improved greatly and became regular and feared competitors in the various tournaments. For the first time, a Turkish team reached the UEFA Cup semi-final (Galatasaray in 1989), the unbeaten European competitions home record of Manchester United was broken (by Fenerbahçe in 1996). Turkey reached the Euro competition for national teams (in 1996,) and a Turkish team won the UEFA Cup and European Super Cup (both by Galatasaray in 2000). In these and other matches, the Turkish fans interacted, and sometimes fought, Italian fans and

Italian ultras. These experiences were a factor that influenced Turkish fans and made them feel more favourable towards the Ultras movement. Progressively, more chose to become ultras and embrace Italian-style *coregrafie*, comprised of strong, autonomous and organized groups, involved in activities such as production of their own merchandise.

The history of UltrAslan illustrates this historical process. During the 1970s, Galatasaray fandom was informal and suffered from two limiting factors. The club did not have its own stadium and along with all other Istanbul teams had to play in Beşiktaş' Inönü Stadium. The Galatasaray fans were not organized, lacked any internal structure and even had to struggle to get a place in the stadium. They were seated according to the districts of Istanbul where they lived. In 1981, Galatasaray moved to its new stadium, Ali Sami Yen, named after one of the founders of Galatasaray Spor Külübü in 1905, and an organized group soon began leading the supporters in the Kapalı stand. (The Kapalı, which means 'closed' in Turkish, faces the stands where the tickets are the most expensive). During the 1990s, this section of the stadium was characterized by a fragmentation of the fan groups and recurrent tensions between them. In 1997, the Galatasaray board decided to raise ticket prices and to reserve a portion of the Kapalı to season ticket holders. As a result, many supporters could not afford to attend matches and the Kapalı seated fans had to move to a less desirable part of the stadium. A year later, some supporters decide to react against these changes and create a new group, calling itself 'Kadıköylü Aslanlar' ('The lions of Kadıköy'). The name was a call of defiance, as Kadıköy is the Istanbul neighbourhood where Fenerbahçe, Galatasaray's greatest rival, was born. Standing in the Kapalı stands, they led the supporters' activities in the stadium and challenged the old-time leaders of the Kapalı. In 2000, the tensions between the two poles of the Kapalı stands resulted in the Kapalı leaders denying Kadıköylü Aslanlar members entrance to the stadium, employing verbal threats. This led to the dissolving of the group. Realizing that the stands had returned to their traditional divisions among 64 different groups, the leaders of these groups held a meeting and decided to unify the Galatasaray fans under a new group: the UltrAslan. The name combines two words: 'Ultras' which is a direct reference to the Italian model of dedicated fans and 'Aslan' which means 'Lion' in Turkish, the king of the jungle being the symbol of Galatasaray. The new group proudly displayed its banner during a 14 February 2001 match between Galatasaray and Deportivo La Coruna. This was one of the first Turkish *coregrafie*, a gigantic flag covering the entire stand.

The creation of the UltrAslan in 2001 can be seen as the effective symbolic integration of the Ultras movement in Turkey. Several groups of supporters have then adopted the Italian practices, especially in visual shows and in the group's products. These groups include Genç Fenerbahçeliler (Fenerbahçe), Çarşı (Beşiktaş), Teksas (Bursa), Yalı (Göztepe Izmir), Çarşı (Karşıyaka Izmir) and Şimşekler (Adana Demirspor). Besides the UltrAslan, other groups have marked their identification with the ultras subculture, including the Teksas Bursa who stamped on some of their scarves with the words 'Ultras Green Boys' and 'Curva Sud, ('South Tribune' in Italian, the *curva* being the place where the ultras usually stand). One branch of the UltrAslan even wrote an Ultras motto in Italian on one of their first scarves – 'Mentalità Ultras. Contro il calcio moderno'.[14]

The Turkish Ultras impressive success in creating a global fandom was attributed also to its increased visual displays in the stands, effective practices and symbolic

supplies. These helped to build a coherent, identifiable group that can strengthen the ties between the fans, and can make clear (through the banners and products) the radicalization of the us/them structure in a football framework. Yet, in this homogeneous fandom model, there is a great diversity of practices, depending on the organization of the groups.

The cultural, political and juridical contexts of a country are important in the determination of the collective aspect of the Ultras subculture. The national context influences both the specific organization of a fans group and its social expectations. Next, we will examine what are the unique aspects of the Turkish Ultras movement and how the Turkish fans have reshaped an Italian born model and made it their own.

Some sociologists explained the Ultras mobilization as an activist behaviour or career. According to Lestrelin, being a fan is to take sides, to be a partisan of a particular cause.[15] Thus, the fans group is the collective action that proposes the means and the tools to struggle for this cause.[16] As Mann states, it is hard to understand and to explain the collective action without studying its structural condition of existence.[17] Questioning fandom under this angle amounts to considering the group itself and describing its inner interactions. Max Weber's concept of church/sect is also useful here.[18] Willaime reinterpreted the Weberian typology as an institution/association opposition.[19] The church/institution is an organization operating under the charisma of the office, and that admits all individuals without considering their religious skills. On the other side, the sect/association is only composed of highly skilled individuals who integrate into the group with a voluntary and personal process. The Ultras groups (as other collective structures such as political parties) are divided according this universalist/elitist polarization. In Italy, the Ultras developed in the extreme and intense political experiences of the 1970s and have been inspired by the birth of small and tightly knit political groupings. Coupled with the geographical and historical fragmentation of Italy, the 'sectarian' type was attractive for many of the Italian groups. In contrast to Italy, the UltrAslan phenomenon shows a different process in the construction of what we propose to name 'a footballistic church'.

The UltrAslan galaxy

The UltrAslan has, since 2001, developed a network of branches and sections, which is unique in the Ultras landscape. The phenomenon of sections in fandom is not specific to Turkey and is quite common among fans of a team, which enjoys a national aura and presence. For example, in France, after winning the Champions League, the French team of Olympique de Marseille has generated nation-wide support. The success of the team led number of the Marseille-based Ultras groups to allow supporters living anywhere in France to create sections. In 2009, the Commando Ultras 1984 had 20 sections in France, while followed by the Yankees Marseille and the Dodgers each could boast of 10 sections each.[20]

The UltrAslan has expanded on this model. There are three different kinds of fan branches. The first variety is linked to the stadium and to the former groups that occupied the stands. Even if the 64 groups agreed to unite into a unique entity, some of them, such as the UltrAslan Ölümüne, wanted to remember their traditions. The UltrAslan Karşı ('Opposite' in Turkish) was a revival of the 'Kadıköylü Aslanlar' experience, with the intent of gathering all the supporters living in the Asian side of Istanbul[21]. The other groups represent the division of work in the

stadium, each component representing a part of the fandom practices: UltrAslan Parçalı was the group of the former fanzine team; UltrAslan best specialized in creating new songs and UltrAslan Sultans who gathered the supporters to attend away games. Another group, UltrAslan Tayfa, can be seen as a special force, a sort of elite. The Tayfa was actually pre-existent to the UltrAslan, as one of the most powerful fans group standing in the Kapalı in the 1990s. Even if this group chose not to display a banner in the stadium, it has gained a strong reputation as having the toughest Galatasaray fans involved in fights. Being a Tayfa member means that one is involved in violent actions and defends the honour of the club in the streets rather than in the stands.

The second category is composed along geographical lines. The UltrAslan soon became attractive to fans living outside Istanbul, who were encouraged to create a section in their own towns. As of early 2012, there are at least 79 groups of this type in Turkey. They can be found across the country: Thrace (Edirne, Tekirdağ and Kırklareli), Marmara region (Bursa, Kocaeli and Sakarya) Mediterranean region (Izmir, Antalya, Denizli, Mersin, Manisa and Çanakkale), Black Sea (Trabzon, Samsun, Zonguldak, Rize and Giresun), Central Anatolia (Ankara, Eskişehir, Kayseri, Konya and Malatya), Eastern Anatolia (Erzurum, Iğdır, Kars and Çorum) and the South-East region (Diyabarkır, Mardin, Urfa and Karhamanmaraş). The UltrAslan has also expanded their network to an international level, taking advantage of the large Turkish diaspora which numbers in the millions. On 20 February 2002, the section UltrAslan Europe displayed its banner during the match against Liverpool at Anfield. They have expanded to the other continents, each section being divided into national subgroups: Europe (Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, the UK and Greece), Africa (Ghana and Dubai), the USA (Canada), Asia (China, South Korea, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) and Australia. As of this writing, these international sections number 35.

The third category of fans includes youth branches of UltrAslan. In 2001, the youngest supporters and all high-school friends decided to create a new group in the Yeni Açık stand and call it 'Bird Hunter' alluding to the canary, the bird that is the symbol of hated rivals Fenerbahçe. Three years later they changed their name for 'UltrAslan Boys of Hell'. The same process occurred with the university student branch. Before 2001, some students used to show a banner recording of their university affiliations such as 'Boğaziçili Aslanlar' 'Yıldızlı Aslanlar' ('The Lions of Bogaziçi University' and 'The Lions of Yıldız University'). In 2003, sixteen students from different universities organized a meeting in the stadium and agreed on combining forces, and being part of the UltrAslan under the subgroup 'UltrAslan Üni'. Unlike the 'Boys of Hell', they expanded their organization following the UltrAslan territorial model. As a result, the Üni branch is divided into sections, each representing a university, for a total of 93 sections. The UltrAslan Üni is present in all the regions of the country: Thrace (Edirne University, Kırklareli University and Trakya University), Marmara (Marmara University, Koç University, Istanbul University, Sakarya University and Kocaeli University), Mediterranean region (Izmir University, Akdeniz University and Selçuk University), Black Sea region (Karadeniz Teknik University and 19 Mayıs University), Central Anatolia (ODTÜ University, Eskişehir University, Hacettepe University and Ankara University), Eastern Anatolia (Rize University and Yüzüncü Yıl University), Southeast Anatolia (Batman University, Gaziantep University and Karhamanmaraş University).

An elaborate system of hierarchical relations and procedures

In order to manage this impressive network of 226 sections, the UltrAslan has created a strict pyramidal organization chart, which is as follows.

The division of work in the different committees is also detailed.

These charts show the decision-making process and the internal rules. As depicted in Figure 1, the Central Committee of the UltrAslan is presided by Sebahattin Şırın (nicknamed 'Sebo Reis' is the referential point of the group. 'Reis' refers to the highest-ranking officers in the Ottoman army and exemplifies the hierarchical structure of the group). Şırın, a Trabzon native, became in the mid-1990s the unofficial leader of the Tayfa, and the entire Kapalı stand therefore recognized his authority. Even if he never got appointed to any official position in the UltrAslan organization (Figure 2), he is seen as the eternal leader of the group. Besides leading the group, the Central Committee monopolizes all the decision-making powers: choreography, new material[22], relations with the club and the media and the messages that can be showed in the stadium. Şırın and Yılmaz (the second in command) are also very watchful over what is done in the several branches and sections of the group, limiting their autonomy. The lack of autonomy is a price that the fans are ready to pay in order to maintain the cohesion of the group. For the younger members, and this concerns the UA Üni and the UA BH, we have to consider that they never experienced the stands before the creation of the UltrAslan, so they were raised in this type of structure, and they do not feel the need to criticize it. I observed this first-hand when I joined the 'pilgrimage' to Anıtkabir organized by the UA-Üni. I attended a general meeting of all the heads of the Üni's sections who were present in Ankara. The meeting was co-directed by the head of the Üni, and the head of the UA Ankara's section (not an Üni). The purpose of the meeting was to limit the autonomy of the Üni's sections concerning the materials. The General Committee of the Üni wanted to forbid all local initiatives, and only allow a



Figure 1. The UltrAslan pyramidal organization.

Figure 2. UltrAslan Central Committee's organizational chart.

general ÜA-Üni brand. No one in the room strongly objected. Maybe we must take into consideration that the turnover in the Youth branches is higher (because the years in high school or college are limited), and their leaders are always dependent to the UA elders. This could point to a third factor, which is the great sense of respect accorded to elders in Turkish society. The members of the different branches are in theory free to choose their own leaders, and thus in the UA-Üni group, for every two years, a board of 15 elects the president. In reality however, the leader must get the Central Committee's approval. This practice dates to the foundation of the UA-Üni, as the first president of the branch described:

> After taking everyone's idea during the second meeting, our big brother Alpaslan[23] chose me as the first General Secretary of the branch.[24]

This institutionalized nature of the decision-making process also limits individual initiative. If a supporter proposes a new idea, he or she must respect the chain of command. The coordinator of UA Sweden explained:

> If I want to get new sweatshirts for my section, I must ask the UA Europe, which asks the Central Committee of Istanbul. After that, the Central Committee gives its answer to the UA Europe, and from them I finally get the positive or negative decision.[25]

One member of the Tayfa detailed the hierarchical process within the Central Committee.

> Olcay Akdeniz is the product manager of the UltrAslan. Each fan group that wants a new product discusses it with Olcay, explaining the cost and the sale price of the product/material. Then, the product/material commissioner must discuss with big brother Sebahattin and big brother Yilmaz brother the approval of the project.[26]

The term used to describe the two leaders was 'abi (ağabey') which means 'big brother' and is a term of respect used when referring to elders. Its use by the Tayfa member is an indication of the relations with the group.

The structure of legitimacy reaffirms one of the aspects of the 'footballistic church': the charisma of the office. The highest authority in the UltrAslan is the president, Sebahattin Şırın, and his current position is a result of his leadership in the Kapali stand before 2001. He gives his consent to every important appointment, and being appointed is viewed as a privilege, as a major gift granted by the leader. This also means that the office is the source of legitimacy, which can be seen as a routinized form of personal charisma. As sociologists Eisenstadt and Weber note, the charisma of the office denotes the process through which the personal charisma is transferred into an orderly institutional reality.[27] The way the UltrAslan has developed an elaborate system of rules, roles and procedures to guide their administrative functions can therefore be described as the routinized institution, the opposite of the pure charismatic groups, and a strong element of the 'footballistic church'.

The universalist nature of the UltrAslan

As we have argued before, the Church/Institution type is closely linked to its Universalist nature, and its will to include a maximum number of followers. The UltrAslan's universalism is the result of its network of branches and sections. In Europe, the ultras groups are usually small[28], but the presence of 226 sections all around the world implies a different scale. It is difficult to agree on a precise number because the UltrAslan has not established an official membership. The only exception is the UA-Üni group, which in 2010 counted 18,000 members. However, several UltrAslan leaders claim a total of one million followers, a number which even if exaggerated testify to its inclusive nature.

The absence of official membership has some consequences on the subjective feeling of belonging to the group. As noted, the ultras subculture is based on an everyday communitarian life that allows the members to build a coherent and relatively closed collective structure. Attending the meetings, preparing the supporters' ritual, spending time in the group's own premises and participating in all the transfers are the common experiences that allow the emergence of this feeling of belonging. These spaces and times are also the multiple frameworks where the group evaluates an individual member's skills and dedication and accepts him or her as 'one of us'. These elements are present with less predominance in the UltrAslan. The UA do not currently own any premises, fundamental for the communitarian life, and therefore the group's identity is mainly elaborated during the match, on the Internet (forums, chats) and at informal meeting places during the week. For instance, the UA-Üni members usually meet on their campus or sometimes the coordinators and the most active fans gather in some bars in the European side of Istanbul (in Nevizade and Tophane). Special events such as national pilgrimages to important historical sites and official events co-organized with the club of Galatasaray are additional occasions to forge a group's identity, even if they remain limited at the branch level.

The inclusive nature is characterized by the various degrees of activism and participation authorized to be considered as an UltrAslan. Taking the criterion of match and transfer attendances, such a variety can be seen in the answers of 120 UltrAslan members living in Istanbul (see Tables 1 and 2).

The number of match attendances is even lower among the coordinators of UA-Üni sections living in Malatya (Southeastern Anatolia), Antalya (Mediterranean

Table 1. Number of match attendances per year.

0–5	6–10	11–15	15–20	All
9	14	20	34	35

Table 2. Number of transfers effectuated per year.

0	1–5	6–10	10
43	38	22	6

Region) and Samsun (Black Sea Region). In these cases, match attendances averages seven per year. Even if we must take into consideration the socio-economic background of the fans and the difficulty of following an Istanbul-based team in a country as large as Turkey, the Turkish ultras do not share the personal and financial sacrifices exhibited by their French or Italian counterparts.

Another significant criterion of devotion to the group is the relation the Turkish ultras have towards their products. A good clue to place a group on the Universalist/Elitist polarization. Selling and distributing the group's emblems and name is not a trivial activity in the ultras subculture. On the contrary, it symbolizes how the ultras handle the relations between members/sympathizers. In the 'sectarian' type, the products are closed; they are reserved for the true members, because the emblems are so valued that they cannot be devaluated by members who just joined or by outsiders. The more open groups, which are a majority of the European groups, decide to sell their products to anyone in order to finance their activities and to represent symbolically a larger number of supporters in the stands. While this type of group usually sells its product in the stadium or on its premises, the UltrAslan has gone further and now sell these via their websites, without any quantity restrictions and without knowing the identity of the buyer.

A large membership, low commitment expected and wide distribution of the symbolic items of belonging, are the elements that sum up this Universalist nature. It is then very hard to distinguish a proper member from a mere sympathizer, because the UltrAslan themselves do not want to make such a distinction. As the Tayfa interviewed stated, the procedure of integration is soft and subjective:

> The UltrAslan is not an association, you don't need to fill a membership form, you don't need to belong to a particular social class in order to become one of us. If you say that you want to come with us to the match, to sing for Galatasaray and to make banners, it is enough for us. Our group is open to everyone, everyone can become an UltrAslan. It is enough for you to say you support Galatasaray.[29]

The UltrAslan and the club Galatasaray battling without battling

In contrast to the former 'Amigos', the UltrAslan learned from the ultras in the way they manage their relations with the club. They claim to be an independent organization, which changes their perception of how to be considered by the Galatasaray officials. An UltrAslan member explains:

> In the past, football clubs had been financing their supporters in non-official ways. For example, they had been providing tickets and buses (…) we are an independent

> movement, we say to the club that if they are successful we clap for them, if they are not we criticize them. This is our relation with the club, they have no direct aid to the UA. Banners belong to only us, we are not afraid of anyone, we are also able to criticize the club, the management. For example, during the last match we reversed the banners, it was for the club.[30] (When a group displays its banner upside down it is a sign of contestation.)

Like most of the European fan groups, the UltrAslan has experienced tensions with their club, over sports and stadium issues, and have often criticized the club. In 2002, Özhan Canaydın was elected the new president of Galatasaray, promising to promote 'fair play' behaviour. His programme directly concerned the UltrAslan as they were condemned by the team's management and held responsible for riots that occurred that year. Canaydın wanted to deny the Galatasaray fans, the right to attend the away derby games (against Fenerbahçe and Beşiktaş), as those matches were prone to fan violence. The UltrAslan responded immediately with protests and actions. During a 24 September match against Barcelona, the Galatasaray fans threw dozens of seats onto the pitch in order to get the club punished by UEFA. After new riots erupted during a November derby against Fenerbahçe, the club pressured the group, forcing it to dissolve their official association 'Genç Galatasaraylılar Derneği' (Young Galatasaray Fan Association). Even if this contentious relationship between the UltrAslan and the team has calmed down in 2004, the poor results of the team and the erratic management choices provoke regularly negative reactions from the ultras. In 2005, they objected to the sale of the popular French player Ribery to Olympique de Marseille after only 14 games, and in 2006 to the announcement of moving to a new stadium, as they felt connected to the Ali Sami Yen, their first true stadium, which bears the name of a Galatasaray legend.

However, the role that the fans play as a counterbalance to manage some of the fans still expect from the club more recognition and cooperation on certain issues. An UltrAslan member summed up this need:

> I will give you an example: I earn a low salary, it is almost impossible for me to come to each match, so I say that the club is obliged to solve this problem. If we have to go to Ankara, we ask them to reserve 1000 places for us, we will buy the tickets, but the club should reserve the places with acceptable prices.[31]

Off the record, some fans admitted that the group could benefit from sometimes receiving free tickets from the club. Another aspect of the collaboration relies on the strong financial support the UltrAslan has provided to the club. In 2003, Galatasaray was in a financial crisis, and the UltrAslan proved its support by two main actions. They organized a worldwide fund-raising campaign among the fans' community, and raised four million Euros for the club. Then, the UltrAslan decided of a previously unheard of in the ultras landscape. Stating that their products were more popular and garnered more sales among the supporters than the club's official merchandise, the group gave the club the trademark rights to its products, for three years, so the UltrAslan brand could be sold in its official shops. These financial actions saved Galatasaray from bankruptcy.

In addition, the Turkish ultras gave indirect support to the club. In Europe, the ultras generally never buy any official club merchandise and always prefer to support economically their group. Our questionnaire results show another tendency in Turkey. The preference of purchase also points in that direction (see Tables 3 and 4).

Telif hakkı olan mate

Table 3. Proportions of UltrAslan and Galatasaray products purchase.

UA > GS	UA = GS	UA < GS
20	22	73

Table 4. Which product do you prefer to buy?

UA	GS	Both
51	23	43

Besides this financial support, the high consumption of the club's merchandise shines light on the type of interaction that ties the Turkish ultras with their club. In Western Europe, the ultras group's product is an essential part of the group constructing a distinctive and confrontational identity. The ultras devaluate every product that comes from the club. The UltrAslan, however, bases their identity on the pre-existing Galatasaray's identity. Indeed, if any supporter can claim to be a part of the UltrAslan, the affirmation of the group's identity does not imply a symbolic separation from the club. This also explains why a large part of the fans interviewed admit to preferring Galatasaray to their own group, an admission inconceivable for the Italian or French ultras. This relationship was seen clearly after the death of Alpaslan Dikmen, in 2008. The club of Galatasaray produced a special scarf, sold only in the official shops, bearing the name and the picture of the deceased UltrAslan leader. In addition, the club co-published with the UltrAslan a book 'Alpaslan'a Mektuplar' ('Letters to Alpaslan') a collection of letters from family and friends, but also from players, officials of the club and Turkish politicians. These initiatives in honour of an ultras fans' leader are unique in the European football landscape. Adnan Polat, the president of Galatasaray at that time, addressed the deceased's son:

> Dear Atahan. There are lots of precious names in history of Galatasaray. Your father Alpaslan Dikmen is one of them. Keep and save this book in memory of your father.[32]

Fatih Terim, the coach who led the club to victory in the 2000 UEFA Cup, developed in his letter his vision of Alpaslan and his group:

> Somehow, I considered him as the captain of the Galatasaray team that stands outside the pitch.[33]

This perception of the relations between the club and the ultras is a source of debate, and in order to understand the debate we must consider the structure of the Galatasaray Board of Directors. Galatasaray Sports Club is a multisport conglomerate involved in several areas: football, basketball, volleyball, athletics, water polo, equestrian, bridge, judo and formula 1 car racing. The Sports Club was founded in 1905 at the elite Galatasaray High School,[34] and its board is mostly comprised of successful businessmen who are alumni. The board is criticized by the UltrAslan for being an 'old boys network' that monopolize all decisions and does not take into consideration anyone else. One UltrAslan expressed this feeling thus:

> If you did not graduated from Galatasaray High School you are always treated as a 'second-class citizen' in the club. We can't become members of the team that we love more than everything. It is 'a high school oligarchy'.[35]

In contrast to their strained relations with this group of club leaders, the UltrAslan had good relations with Adnan Polat, the club's president between 2008 and 2011, who was businessman from Erzurum. At every game he attended, they sang songs praising him and referring to him as 'Büyük Paşa', a reference to the eighteenth century leader who came from humble origins. (Adnan Polat's father was a construction worker but then became rich and is now the head of a large construction company.) The UltrAslan intends to end the administrative elitism by promoting a 'Spanish-like' system where, like in some Spanish clubs, the fans are the shareholders, and thus have the power of decision. One UltrAslan commissioner said:

> For example, the club invests millions of dollars in order that those investments bring money for Galatasaray. You have to figure out that we wait for a bunch of people in their 80 and 90 sitting around a table to vote. As supporters we have no rights in the club, and this is pissing us off.[36]

Lestrelin explains that football is a way to 'make the territory' (city, region and nation), identify with a place and to claim a particular identity.[37] The UltrAslan and the board are engaged in a conflict about the territorial and symbolic view of what Galatasaray should be. The board wishes to restrict the leadership to graduates of their elite alma mater while the UltrAslan proposes a more universalist perspective of what has become Galatasaray: a popular club, not limited in its support and outreach to Istanbul, that can gather a community not only in Turkey but wherever a fan base stands. In these goals, the UltrAslan has accomplished and pursued the purpose that Ali Sami Yen, founder of the Football team in 1905, attributed to Galatasaray: 'From the beginning, we aimed to have team play like the British, to have proper colours and fame, and to win against the non-Turkish teams'. Alpaslan and the UltrAslan also kept the founder's memory, including by visiting Ali Sami Yen's wife in her retirement home while the club's officials forgot her. The Turkish winning vision of Ali Sami Yen also leads to investigate the nationalist nature of the group.

UltrAslan and Turkey: 'banal' or 'theatrical' nationalism?

As argued before, the nationalism issue has been the main concern raised by the researchers focused on Turkish football and fandom. Referring to Bilig's theory of 'banal nationalism', Bora and Senyuva emphasize that the 'banal' symptoms that manifest themselves in non-doctrinaire and performative acts are powerful features of nationalism, and especially clear in Turkish football, which can be depicted as 'a live expression of this banal/ordinary nationalism'.[38] Looking closely at the UltrAslan, several factors affect this phenomenon of reproducing nationalist beliefs and codes. The ultras are still emotionally attached to their national symbols. They usually sing loudly the national anthem that is performed before every league and cup match. They kept Atatürk's[39] memory alive, regarding him as the 'immortal man' of the country and celebrated him on their official website with section called 'Atatürk and Galatasaray'. In October 2009, the UltrAslan-Üni even organized a pilgrimage to his mausoleum in Ankara. They ritualized the visit: two soldiers laid flowers on Atatürk's grave, and the branch's president gave a speech honouring 'the

country's father', and noting how the fans followed in his footsteps. In March 2010, they organized another pilgrimage to Çanakkale[40], honouring the dead soldiers of the First World War.[41] The same attention and respect are shown to the Turkish flag, as the UltrAslan demands it from the members.

Irak argues that during the 1990s the Nationalist Party, the MHP, embarked on a massive infiltration of the Turkish football stadiums in order to recruit new activists to its cause and to disseminate its nationalist messages through football.[42] According to him, the fact that Alpaslan Dikmen was a columnist for Yeniçağ, the nationalist newspaper, demonstrates these intents. Even if Alpaslan Dikmen was known to be an executive of the Ülkücükler (the youth branch of the MHP) and a defender of the Army's programme, launched after 1980, to diminish the contestations of the 1970s and especially to marginalize any leftist movement[43], we cannot conclude that the fans were under the authority of a nationalist and racist ideology. We can assume that his Dikmen's political position helped to construct a centralized and massive organization, but his ideology was never part of the fans group official beliefs. Indeed, the UltrAslan is composed of individuals coming from several and opposite social origins, individuals holding opposite political opinions. As an UltrAslan member claiming to be a communist activist confided:

> We have participated in the demonstrations that took place in Çağalayan on May 1st. We didn't go as UltrAslan but we went there with a bunch of friends from the group. Our yardstick is the Turkish flag. Except for the Turkish flag we can't let any fraction or movement come into the UltrAslan.[44]

The national flag has become a more neutral signification, a basic symbol of cohesion. It is not used in an exclusive way, as several UltrAslan are not ethnically Turkish or religiously Muslim. The same communist member explained that the group's leader respects this diversity:

> It is impossible to make an ethnical, political, religious ideological difference in the UltrAslan because your friend who is besides you in the group can think totally different from you in social life (…) we use no religious items because there are lots of non-Muslim, Jewish, supporters in UA. Brother S. is a religious man. Like everybody we have also condemned the tragic events that occurred in Gaza, even the communist party was there. We have a Jewish friend, a very good friend, he was also with us, but of course while we are formulating our judgments about Palestine, we pay a lot of attention in order not to be offensive.[45]

Banners with political messages do appear, supporting dominated nationalities such as the Palestinians or the Chinese Uygurs. The leaders of the movement are, however, reluctant to disseminate messages about social protests, such as the 2010 Tekel workers' strike, that could be used or interpreted in a political way. Being a UA has no connection to the individual's political behaviour, no influence on their voting or activist commitment. A communist, an Islamist, even a supporter of the Kurds and their rights, could stand together in the group, if they do not insult publicly some national symbols. Therefore, we can define the UltrAslan as an apolitical group.

Some scholars emphasize the nationalist messages of the Turkish fans, [46]as expressed when they play against European, and especially Greek teams, we differ in our interpretation. During a 3 March 2009 match between Galatasaray and Panathinaikos FC (of Athens) that the author attended, the UltrAslan began singing

several songs that carry a strong pro-Turks message, including 'Türkiye, Türkiye' (Turkey, Turkey), 'Istanbul burası, Istanbul burası' (This is Istanbul), 'Fatih Sultan Mehmet[47]'. Yet, according to Dal Lago, the ultras subculture is characterized by a 'euphemized battle' against their opponent and must use any possible element at their disposal to humiliate and overcome the enemy. Dal Lago, here follows George Orwell's well-known statement that '(Football) is war minus the shooting', [48]when he states that football has become a way to perform a military act without suffering the consequences of a real one. The ultras incorporate much from the military sphere, including the names of their groups, some offensive banners, some of their songs or their slogans. Dal Lago innovates because he focuses on all the rituals that are displayed to transform the match into a proper, and yet, symbolic battle.[49] While the physical confrontation with their opponents is the ultimate step in their battle, on the stands, the ultras have to win the symbolic war of expression. The ultras must prove their superiority with other means such as singing louder, being more sarcastic and possessing more spectacular displays. Everything that can be held and used against a particular enemy, such as the size or the characteristics of its city, its reputation, its friends and its political ideas, is mobilized during the match to humiliate and overcome the enemy. The references to past victories, especially in Italy where for 100 years there were wars and competition between the major cities, are therefore a recurrent and banal phenomenon, and Turkey is not an exception in this nationalist fever that emerges during the European competitions.

Turkey and the UltrAslan: an alternative fabric of the nation

The key explanation for the non-partisan behaviour, this 'light and inclusive nationalism', can be found in the political and social context existing since the middle of the 1990s, a context in which the formation and development of the UltrAslan have taken place. During these years, Turkey has been affected by major events that revealed how deep the political and social divisions were, and how fragile national unity was. The first split is the ongoing political battle between the secular and Islamic parties. In 1996, Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamic Party Refah, became Prime Minister. He was suspected for all the modernist/secular forces of the country, including the Army and secular parties and their supporters of threatening the secular nature of the Republic and on 28 February 1997 was dismissed by a military *coup d'état*. The 2002, 2007 and 2011 electoral successes of the AKP party, which is both moderate and Islamic, aroused again the suspicion of the leftist and secular sectors. In May 2007, several massive demonstrations against the government were held, an attempt to maintain the secular nature of the state, and an indication of this fear. The AKP's responded with an attack trials in 2008 against the leaders of Turkey's military, charging them with an attempted *coup d'état*. These trials were viewed in the light of the fact that since the beginning of the republic, the army has been a defender of the secular order. In addition to the religious-secular divide, The Kurdish issue has also dominated the public agenda. In 1991, 10 Kurdish members of the National Assembly used the banned Kurdish language as they were sworn in. They were immediately banned from the Assembly and their party was dissolved, which led to a new campaign of terrorism by the separatist movement, the PKK, in the following years. Even though a peace process began in 1999 between the PKK, the failure in December 2009 of the ruling Islamic party's plan for the Kurds revived the tensions and military confrontations. In addition, as

public opinions polls reveal, a majority of the European public views Turkey with suspicion, believing it to be a homogenized religious state in which 99% of its population hold Muslim beliefs. In reality, the country is more heterogeneous as between 15 and 20% of the population are Alevis, [50]and two and a half per cent are Tare twelvers Shi'as. These two groups suffer discrimination. In Turkey, the state controls religious affairs and decides what religions are official and can receive state funding (for salaries of religious leaders and construction of mosques). Both the Alevis and the Shi'as are not recognized by the state as religions. They are also stigmatized by the Sunni majority who consider them as false Muslims and potential traitors. In 1993 in Sivas, during an Alevi religious ceremony, hundreds of radicals Sunni surrounded the hotel where it took place and finally burnt it and killed 37 persons. Starting in 2007, the AKP government tried to reach out toward the minorities but ended this attempt three years later without satisfying any of their demands. The end of the 1990s was particularly devastating. In 1999, the big earthquake in the Marmara Region showed how the Army and the State were unable to protect the population, and the economic crisis revealed the weakness of the financial structures of the country.

Many crises and divisions that were just described explain why so many Turks found in football and especially in the 2000 victories of Galatasaray are a way out of this agitated context. The UltrAslan could surf on this wave of social expectation that surrounded the only collective structure that presented a winning and united force when everything seemed to crumble in the country. This is a factor of the relative non-confrontational behaviour the UltrAslan adopted in confrontation to their club, because the Galatasaray identity is the only common denominator that strengthens the fans community. The UltrAslan is a mirror of the contemporary Turkish society, as the central committee shows: Sebahattin Şırın is known to be a religious man, one of his second in command is Kurdish; and Alpaslan Dikmen was a nationalist executive. The supporters we met presented various political ideologies: pro-secular, nationalist, pro-government, communist, Muslim and Alevi. Yet, the way they constructed a welcoming 'footballistic church' can be seen as an attempt to transcend these disparities in order to recreate a united community under the Galatasaray banner. Paraphrasing Rowe, we could say that the more the national-political, economic and military sovereignty is undermined, the greater the need for the people to find again a semiotically potent cultural nation.[51] Organized fandom, through its own symbols, rituals and sense of belonging is in Turkey the alternative collective means that reshape and reinforce the social fabric of the nation.

Conclusion

The Turkish interpretation of the Ultras movement is far from being the Nationalist and violent hell that has been portrayed in the western media. On the contrary, it appears to be a more inclusive fans' community that allows anyone who wants to identify strongly with the team to join the group. The Turkish inclusiveness of the ultras is in contrast to smaller and more radicalized small entities found in Italy and France. The national aura of Galatasaray constitutes therefore the fundamental basis of the creation of the 'footballistic church'. This organizational type is bound to the particular Turkish football situation where nearly 90% of the fans support one of the three main Istanbul teams (Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe and Beşiktaş). We could assume that the UltrAslan's main rivals also propose the social functions of

gathering a fractured nation around a football team. However, fandom is a very flexible phenomenon, and the ultras are in constant flux, according to the local and national contexts. We hope that this study will be augmented by comparative studies held in Turkish cities where there is greater local pride. These cities include Trabzon, the major city in the Black Sea region, which was an important city during the Byzantine Empire; Izmir, which like other port-cities (Naples, Barcelona and Marseille), is viewed by the general population of the country as being more rebellious and independent, and its nickname, 'Gevur' (non-Muslim) Izmir, reflects its social liberalism; and Bursa which was a former Imperial capital. In these cities, the ultras have a greater sense of city belonging and thus present a different sense of identification with their local teams.

Notes

1. Bromberger introduces his study with the description of a football match by the French writer and poet Philippe Soupault. The co-founder of the Surrealist movement borrows the point of view of a profane traveller, whose narrative detachment points out the gap between the bizarre actions on the field and their emotional impact on the stands. The scene evokes this paradox of a futile game and the intense passion it creates.
2. Bromberger, *Le match de football*, 6–10.
3. Bromberger, *Passions ordinaires*.
4. Polo, *Le sport au service de la candidature de la Turquie à l'Union Européenne*, 2–3.
5. Ibid., 14–7.
6. Gökalp, *Beware the Turks are Coming*.
7. Ibid., 16.
8. Bora Tanıl and Senyuva Özgehan, 'Nationalism, Europeanization And Football: Turkish Fandom Transformed?' in *Football, Europe et régulations*, ed. Guillaume Robin (Lille: Septentrion, Presses Universitaires, 2011); Kozanoğlu Can, 'Beyond Edirne: Football and the National Identity Crisis in Turkey' in *Football, Cultures and Identities*, ed. Armstrong and Giulanotti (McMillan Press, London, 1999); Gökalp Emre. 'Beware the Turks are coming! Reproducing Turkish nationalism(s) through the press coverage of football games'. *RAMSES Series on Europe and the Mediterranean, Working Paper 7/06* (October 2006); Polo Jean-François. *Le sport au service de la candidature de la Turquie à l'Union Européenne*, (written paper presented at Congrès de l'Association française de science politique. Strasbourg France, August 31–September 2). However, we can mention Artun Ünsal's researches, one of the rare scholars interested in the communitarian aspect of Turkish fandom: Ünsal Artun, 'Aspects de néo-communautarisme *chez* les fans de football et de basket-ball en Turquie', in *Le technocentrisme: promesses et menaces*, ed. Ali Ergur (Recherches à l'Université Galatasaray, Harmattan, Paris, 2008).
9. Even if the origins of the Ultras movement are rooted in some pre-existent Italian fans groups (such as I Leoni della Maratona or I Fedelissimi, supporting Torino FC), there is a consensus among scholars and the Ultras to considerer 'la Fossa dei Leoni', supporting Milan AC, as the first Ultras group, when they exposed their banner for the first time in 1968.
10. Since the beginning of the 1990s several scholars or journalists produced historical works on the Ultras movement. Roversi Antonio, *Calcio, tifo e violenza. Il teppismo calcistico in Italia* (Il Mulino, Bologna, 1992); Marchi Valerio, 'Ultrà uno stile di vita', in *Fanatics.Voci, documenti, materiali dal movimento ultra*, ed. Colombo et De Luca (Castelvecchi, Roma, 1996); Hourcade Nicolas, 'La place des supporters dans le monde du football'. *Pouvoirs* 101 (April 2002) 75–87; Louis Sebastien, *Le phénomène ultras en Italie*, (Mare et Martin, 2008); Giovanni Francesco, *Tifare contro. Una storia degli ultras italiani* (Sperling and Kupfer, 2008).
11. Created in 1985, the ultras fanzine Supertifo, published in the early 1990's several articles on the European ultras groups in France, Spain or Yugoslavia. We can also find some websites dedicated to the history of the ultras. On Romanian ultras, www.ultras-spirit.com (http://www.ultrasspirit.com/the-history-of-ultras-in-romania.html); on Asian

ultras, www.ultras-tifo.net (http://www.ultras-tifo.net/news/27-ultras-in-asia.html); on ultras culture in North America, www.ultrasmontreal.com (http://www.ultrasmontreal.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=8004&start=45).

12. In the ultras jargon, the material designates all the clothes that bear the emblems and the name of the group. For a better understanding we will use instead the word 'product'.
13. Irak, 'The transformation football fandom in Turkey since the 1970s', 181.
14. Ultras state of mind. Against modern football.
15. Lestrelin, *L'autre public des matchs de football*, 14–5.
16. Ibid., 109–12.
17. Mann, *L'action collective. Mobilisation et organisation des minorités actives*, 33.
18. Weber, *Sociologie des religions*, 317–19.
19. Willaime, *Sociologie du Protestantisme*, 32.
20. Lestrelin, op. cit. 117.
21. The Galatasaray headquarters were traditionally located in the European side of Istanbul, so are Ali Sami Yen and Türk Telecom Arena, the former and current stadiums of the club. Karşı symbolizes the opposite bank of the Bosporus, which divides the city.
22. Only recently, the UltrAslan board has introduced a democratic process. In May 2010, they proposed six models for a new t-shirt, the final choice was adopted through a vote on the website of the group. They haven't renewed this initiative since.
23. Alpaslan Dikmen, one of the founders of the UltrAslan in 2001, who died in a car accident the 27 September 2008.
24. UA Üni's official website. http://www.ultraslan-uni.org/hakkimizda. Last view: 28 October 2011.
25. Interview with the coordinator of UA Sweden, Istanbul, 1 November 2009.
26. Interview with a Tayfa member, Istanbul, 5 May 2010.
27. Eisenstadt and Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building*, xxi.
28. In order to give an idea of the proportions involved, we can mention our case studies: 30/40 members for the Ultras Fighters Viareggio, 200 members for the Boys Parma and 250 members for the Ultramarines Bordeaux.
29. Interview with a Tayfa member, Istanbul, 5 May 2010.
30. Interview with an UltrAslan member, Istanbul, 14 April 2010.
31. Interview with an UltrAslan member, Istanbul, 14 April 2010.
32. Şanlı, *Alpaslan'a Mektuplar*, 28.
33. Ibid., 57–8.
34. Until 1969, all the players of the team had to be graduated from the high school, except Metin Oktay, the hall of fame striker of the 60s.
35. Interview with an UltrAslan responsible, Istanbul, 17 May 2010.
36. Interview with an UltrAslan member, Istanbul, 25 March 2010.
37. Lestrelin, op. cit.
38. Bora and Senyuva, *Nationalism, europeanization and football: Turkish fandom transformed?*, 35.
39. Mustafa Kemal Atatük was a military hero and founder, in 1923, of the Turkish Republic.
40. In the World War One Battle of Çanakkale (known also as the Battle of Gallipoli) the Ottoman forces triumphed over the European Alliance.
41. Over seven decades after his death, people see in Atatürk what they want to see: the resistance to foreign imperialism, the father of the nation, the modernist and secular leader, etc, finding in his ideas and action what they wish to find. Çanakkale is a memorial that emphasizes the need of peace. All Atatürk's quotes on the monument are an expression of great regret for the bloodshed.
42. Irak, op. cit., 177–8.
43. Türkislam is the affirmation of an essentialist definition of a 'turkicity' reserved for ethnic Turks and sunni-halafi Muslims.
44. Interview with a Tayfa member, Istanbul, 5 May 2010.
45. Interview with a Tayfa member, Istanbul, 5 May 2010.
46. Bora and Senyuva, op cit, 37; Polo, op. cit., 15.
47. Sultan Mehmet the 2nd conquered the city of Constantinople in 1453.
48. Orwell, *The Sporting Spirit*.

49. Dal Lago, *Descrizione di una battaglia. I rituali del calcio*.
50. A heterodox syncretic Islamic religion.
51. Rowe, *Sport, Culture and the Media*, 133.

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